Ultimate glossary of crypto currency terms, acronyms and abbreviations
Summary: Everyone knows that when you give your assets to someone else, they always keep them safe. If this is true for individuals, it is certainly true for businesses. Custodians always tell the truth and manage funds properly. They won't have any interest in taking the assets as an exchange operator would. Auditors tell the truth and can't be misled. That's because organizations that are regulated are incapable of lying and don't make mistakes. First, some background. Here is a summary of how custodians make us more secure: Previously, we might give Alice our crypto assets to hold. There were risks:
Alice might take the assets and disappear.
Alice might spend the assets and pretend that she still has them (fractional model).
Alice might store the assets insecurely and they'll get stolen.
Alice might give the assets to someone else by mistake or by force.
Alice might lose access to the assets.
But "no worries", Alice has a custodian named Bob. Bob is dressed in a nice suit. He knows some politicians. And he drives a Porsche. "So you have nothing to worry about!". And look at all the benefits we get:
Alice can't take the assets and disappear (unless she asks Bob or never gives them to Bob).
Alice can't spend the assets and pretend that she still has them. (Unless she didn't give them to Bob or asks him for them.)
Alice can't store the assets insecurely so they get stolen. (After all - she doesn't have any control over the withdrawal process from any of Bob's systems, right?)
Alice can't give the assets to someone else by mistake or by force. (Bob will stop her, right Bob?)
Alice can't lose access to the funds. (She'll always be present, sane, and remember all secrets, right?)
See - all problems are solved! All we have to worry about now is:
Bob might take the assets and disappear.
Bob might spend the assets and pretend that he still has them (fractional model).
Bob might store the assets insecurely and they'll get stolen.
Bob might give the assets to someone else by mistake or by force.
Bob might lose access to the assets.
It's pretty simple. Before we had to trust Alice. Now we only have to trust Alice, Bob, and all the ways in which they communicate. Just think of how much more secure we are! "On top of that", Bob assures us, "we're using a special wallet structure". Bob shows Alice a diagram. "We've broken the balance up and store it in lots of smaller wallets. That way", he assures her, "a thief can't take it all at once". And he points to a historic case where a large sum was taken "because it was stored in a single wallet... how stupid". "Very early on, we used to have all the crypto in one wallet", he said, "and then one Christmas a hacker came and took it all. We call him the Grinch. Now we individually wrap each crypto and stick it under a binary search tree. The Grinch has never been back since." "As well", Bob continues, "even if someone were to get in, we've got insurance. It covers all thefts and even coercion, collusion, and misplaced keys - only subject to the policy terms and conditions." And with that, he pulls out a phone-book sized contract and slams it on the desk with a thud. "Yep", he continues, "we're paying top dollar for one of the best policies in the country!" "Can I read it?' Alice asks. "Sure," Bob says, "just as soon as our legal team is done with it. They're almost through the first chapter." He pauses, then continues. "And can you believe that sales guy Mike? He has the same year Porsche as me. I mean, what are the odds?" "Do you use multi-sig?", Alice asks. "Absolutely!" Bob replies. "All our engineers are fully trained in multi-sig. Whenever we want to set up a new wallet, we generate 2 separate keys in an air-gapped process and store them in this proprietary system here. Look, it even requires the biometric signature from one of our team members to initiate any withdrawal." He demonstrates by pressing his thumb into the display. "We use a third-party cloud validation API to match the thumbprint and authorize each withdrawal. The keys are also backed up daily to an off-site third-party." "Wow that's really impressive," Alice says, "but what if we need access for a withdrawal outside of office hours?" "Well that's no issue", Bob says, "just send us an email, call, or text message and we always have someone on staff to help out. Just another part of our strong commitment to all our customers!" "What about Proof of Reserve?", Alice asks. "Of course", Bob replies, "though rather than publish any blockchain addresses or signed transaction, for privacy we just do a SHA256 refactoring of the inverse hash modulus for each UTXO nonce and combine the smart contract coefficient consensus in our hyperledger lightning node. But it's really simple to use." He pushes a button and a large green checkmark appears on a screen. "See - the algorithm ran through and reserves are proven." "Wow", Alice says, "you really know your stuff! And that is easy to use! What about fiat balances?" "Yeah, we have an auditor too", Bob replies, "Been using him for a long time so we have quite a strong relationship going! We have special books we give him every year and he's very efficient! Checks the fiat, crypto, and everything all at once!" "We used to have a nice offline multi-sig setup we've been using without issue for the past 5 years, but I think we'll move all our funds over to your facility," Alice says. "Awesome", Bob replies, "Thanks so much! This is perfect timing too - my Porsche got a dent on it this morning. We have the paperwork right over here." "Great!", Alice replies. And with that, Alice gets out her pen and Bob gets the contract. "Don't worry", he says, "you can take your crypto-assets back anytime you like - just subject to our cancellation policy. Our annual management fees are also super low and we don't adjust them often". How many holes have to exist for your funds to get stolen? Just one. Why are we taking a powerful offline multi-sig setup, widely used globally in hundreds of different/lacking regulatory environments with 0 breaches to date, and circumventing it by a demonstrably weak third party layer? And paying a great expense to do so? If you go through the list of breaches in the past 2 years to highly credible organizations, you go through the list of major corporate frauds (only the ones we know about), you go through the list of all the times platforms have lost funds, you go through the list of times and ways that people have lost their crypto from identity theft, hot wallet exploits, extortion, etc... and then you go through this custodian with a fine-tooth comb and truly believe they have value to add far beyond what you could, sticking your funds in a wallet (or set of wallets) they control exclusively is the absolute worst possible way to take advantage of that security. The best way to add security for crypto-assets is to make a stronger multi-sig. With one custodian, what you are doing is giving them your cryptocurrency and hoping they're honest, competent, and flawlessly secure. It's no different than storing it on a really secure exchange. Maybe the insurance will cover you. Didn't work for Bitpay in 2015. Didn't work for Yapizon in 2017. Insurance has never paid a claim in the entire history of cryptocurrency. But maybe you'll get lucky. Maybe your exact scenario will buck the trend and be what they're willing to cover. After the large deductible and hopefully without a long and expensive court battle. And you want to advertise this increase in risk, the lapse of judgement, an accident waiting to happen, as though it's some kind of benefit to customers ("Free institutional-grade storage for your digital assets.")? And then some people are writing to the OSC that custodians should be mandatory for all funds on every exchange platform? That this somehow will make Canadians as a whole more secure or better protected compared with standard air-gapped multi-sig? On what planet? Most of the problems in Canada stemmed from one thing - a lack of transparency. If Canadians had known what a joke Quadriga was - it wouldn't have grown to lose $400m from hard-working Canadians from coast to coast to coast. And Gerald Cotten would be in jail, not wherever he is now (at best, rotting peacefully). EZ-BTC and mister Dave Smilie would have been a tiny little scam to his friends, not a multi-million dollar fraud. Einstein would have got their act together or been shut down BEFORE losing millions and millions more in people's funds generously donated to criminals. MapleChange wouldn't have even been a thing. And maybe we'd know a little more about CoinTradeNewNote - like how much was lost in there. Almost all of the major losses with cryptocurrency exchanges involve deception with unbacked funds. So it's great to see transparency reports from BitBuy and ShakePay where someone independently verified the backing. The only thing we don't have is:
ANY CERTAINTY BALANCES WEREN'T EXCLUDED. Quadriga's largest account was $70m. 80% of funds are in 20% of accounts (Pareto principle). All it takes is excluding a few really large accounts - and nobody's the wiser. A fractional platform can easily pass any audit this way.
ANY VISIBILITY WHATSOEVER INTO THE CUSTODIANS. BitBuy put out their report before moving all the funds to their custodian and ShakePay apparently can't even tell us who the custodian is. That's pretty important considering that basically all of the funds are now stored there.
ANY IDEA ABOUT THE OTHER EXCHANGES. In order for this to be effective, it has to be the norm. It needs to be "unusual" not to know. If obscurity is the norm, then it's super easy for people like Gerald Cotten and Dave Smilie to blend right in.
It's not complicated to validate cryptocurrency assets. They need to exist, they need to be spendable, and they need to cover the total balances. There are plenty of credible people and firms across the country that have the capacity to reasonably perform this validation. Having more frequent checks by different, independent, parties who publish transparent reports is far more valuable than an annual check by a single "more credible/official" party who does the exact same basic checks and may or may not publish anything. Here's an example set of requirements that could be mandated:
First report within 1 month of launching, another within 3 months, and further reports at minimum every 6 months thereafter.
No auditor can be repeated within a 12 month period.
All reports must be public, identifying the auditor and the full methodology used.
All auditors must be independent of the firm being audited with no conflict of interest.
Reports must include the percentage of each asset backed, and how it's backed.
The auditor publishes a hash list, which lists a hash of each customer's information and balances that were included. Hash is one-way encryption so privacy is fully preserved. Every customer can use this to have 100% confidence they were included.
If we want more extensive requirements on audits, these should scale upward based on the total assets at risk on the platform, and whether the platform has loaned their assets out.
There are ways to structure audits such that neither crypto assets nor customer information are ever put at risk, and both can still be properly validated and publicly verifiable. There are also ways to structure audits such that they are completely reasonable for small platforms and don't inhibit innovation in any way. By making the process as reasonable as possible, we can completely eliminate any reason/excuse that an honest platform would have for not being audited. That is arguable far more important than any incremental improvement we might get from mandating "the best of the best" accountants. Right now we have nothing mandated and tons of Canadians using offshore exchanges with no oversight whatsoever. Transparency does not prove crypto assets are safe. CoinTradeNewNote, Flexcoin ($600k), and Canadian Bitcoins ($100k) are examples where crypto-assets were breached from platforms in Canada. All of them were online wallets and used no multi-sig as far as any records show. This is consistent with what we see globally - air-gapped multi-sig wallets have an impeccable record, while other schemes tend to suffer breach after breach. We don't actually know how much CoinTrader lost because there was no visibility. Rather than publishing details of what happened, the co-founder of CoinTrader silently moved on to found another platform - the "most trusted way to buy and sell crypto" - a site that has no information whatsoever (that I could find) on the storage practices and a FAQ advising that “[t]rading cryptocurrency is completely safe” and that having your own wallet is “entirely up to you! You can certainly keep cryptocurrency, or fiat, or both, on the app.” Doesn't sound like much was learned here, which is really sad to see. It's not that complicated or unreasonable to set up a proper hardware wallet. Multi-sig can be learned in a single course. Something the equivalent complexity of a driver's license test could prevent all the cold storage exploits we've seen to date - even globally. Platform operators have a key advantage in detecting and preventing fraud - they know their customers far better than any custodian ever would. The best job that custodians can do is to find high integrity individuals and train them to form even better wallet signatories. Rather than mandating that all platforms expose themselves to arbitrary third party risks, regulations should center around ensuring that all signatories are background-checked, properly trained, and using proper procedures. We also need to make sure that signatories are empowered with rights and responsibilities to reject and report fraud. They need to know that they can safely challenge and delay a transaction - even if it turns out they made a mistake. We need to have an environment where mistakes are brought to the surface and dealt with. Not one where firms and people feel the need to hide what happened. In addition to a knowledge-based test, an auditor can privately interview each signatory to make sure they're not in coercive situations, and we should make sure they can freely and anonymously report any issues without threat of retaliation. A proper multi-sig has each signature held by a separate person and is governed by policies and mutual decisions instead of a hierarchy. It includes at least one redundant signature. For best results, 3of4, 3of5, 3of6, 4of5, 4of6, 4of7, 5of6, or 5of7. History has demonstrated over and over again the risk of hot wallets even to highly credible organizations. Nonetheless, many platforms have hot wallets for convenience. While such losses are generally compensated by platforms without issue (for example Poloniex, Bitstamp, Bitfinex, Gatecoin, Coincheck, Bithumb, Zaif, CoinBene, Binance, Bitrue, Bitpoint, Upbit, VinDAX, and now KuCoin), the public tends to focus more on cases that didn't end well. Regardless of what systems are employed, there is always some level of risk. For that reason, most members of the public would prefer to see third party insurance. Rather than trying to convince third party profit-seekers to provide comprehensive insurance and then relying on an expensive and slow legal system to enforce against whatever legal loopholes they manage to find each and every time something goes wrong, insurance could be run through multiple exchange operators and regulators, with the shared interest of having a reputable industry, keeping costs down, and taking care of Canadians. For example, a 4 of 7 multi-sig insurance fund held between 5 independent exchange operators and 2 regulatory bodies. All Canadian exchanges could pay premiums at a set rate based on their needed coverage, with a higher price paid for hot wallet coverage (anything not an air-gapped multi-sig cold wallet). Such a model would be much cheaper to manage, offer better coverage, and be much more reliable to payout when needed. The kind of coverage you could have under this model is unheard of. You could even create something like the CDIC to protect Canadians who get their trading accounts hacked if they can sufficiently prove the loss is legitimate. In cases of fraud, gross negligence, or insolvency, the fund can be used to pay affected users directly (utilizing the last transparent balance report in the worst case), something which private insurance would never touch. While it's recommended to have official policies for coverage, a model where members vote would fully cover edge cases. (Could be similar to the Supreme Court where justices vote based on case law.) Such a model could fully protect all Canadians across all platforms. You can have a fiat coverage governed by legal agreements, and crypto-asset coverage governed by both multi-sig and legal agreements. It could be practical, affordable, and inclusive. Now, we are at a crossroads. We can happily give up our freedom, our innovation, and our money. We can pay hefty expenses to auditors, lawyers, and regulators year after year (and make no mistake - this cost will grow to many millions or even billions as the industry grows - and it will be borne by all Canadians on every platform because platforms are not going to eat up these costs at a loss). We can make it nearly impossible for any new platform to enter the marketplace, forcing Canadians to use the same stagnant platforms year after year. We can centralize and consolidate the entire industry into 2 or 3 big players and have everyone else fail (possibly to heavy losses of users of those platforms). And when a flawed security model doesn't work and gets breached, we can make it even more complicated with even more people in suits making big money doing the job that blockchain was supposed to do in the first place. We can build a system which is so intertwined and dependent on big government, traditional finance, and central bankers that it's future depends entirely on that of the fiat system, of fractional banking, and of government bail-outs. If we choose this path, as history has shown us over and over again, we can not go back, save for revolution. Our children and grandchildren will still be paying the consequences of what we decided today. Or, we can find solutions that work. We can maintain an open and innovative environment while making the adjustments we need to make to fully protect Canadian investors and cryptocurrency users, giving easy and affordable access to cryptocurrency for all Canadians on the platform of their choice, and creating an environment in which entrepreneurs and problem solvers can bring those solutions forward easily. None of the above precludes innovation in any way, or adds any unreasonable cost - and these three policies would demonstrably eliminate or resolve all 109 historic cases as studied here - that's every single case researched so far going back to 2011. It includes every loss that was studied so far not just in Canada but globally as well. Unfortunately, finding answers is the least challenging part. Far more challenging is to get platform operators and regulators to agree on anything. My last post got no response whatsoever, and while the OSC has told me they're happy for industry feedback, I believe my opinion alone is fairly meaningless. This takes the whole community working together to solve. So please let me know your thoughts. Please take the time to upvote and share this with people. Please - let's get this solved and not leave it up to other people to do. Facts/background/sources (skip if you like):
The inspiration for the paragraph about splitting wallets was an actual quote from a Canadian company providing custodial services in response to the OSC consultation paper: "We believe that it will be in the in best interests of investors to prohibit pooled crypto assets or ‘floats’. Most Platforms pool assets, citing reasons of practicality and expense. The recent hack of the world’s largest Platform – Binance – demonstrates the vulnerability of participants’ assets when such concessions are made. In this instance, the Platform’s entire hot wallet of Bitcoins, worth over $40 million, was stolen, facilitated in part by the pooling of client crypto assets." "the maintenance of participants (and Platform) crypto assets across multiple wallets distributes the related risk and responsibility of security - reducing the amount of insurance coverage required and making insurance coverage more readily obtainable". For the record, their reply also said nothing whatsoever about multi-sig or offline storage.
In addition to the fact that the $40m hack represented only one "hot wallet" of Binance, and they actually had the vast majority of assets in other wallets (including mostly cold wallets), multiple real cases have clearly demonstrated that risk is still present with multiple wallets. Bitfinex, VinDAX, Bithumb, Altsbit, BitPoint, Cryptopia, and just recently KuCoin all had multiple wallets breached all at the same time, and may represent a significantly larger impact on customers than the Binance breach which was fully covered by Binance. To represent that simply having multiple separate wallets under the same security scheme is a comprehensive way to reduce risk is just not true.
Private insurance has historically never covered a single loss in the cryptocurrency space (at least, not one that I was able to find), and there are notable cases where massive losses were not covered by insurance. Bitpay in 2015 and Yapizon in 2017 both had insurance policies that didn't pay out during the breach, even after a lengthly court process. The same insurance that ShakePay is presently using (and announced to much fanfare) was describe by their CEO himself as covering “physical theft of the media where the private keys are held,” which is something that has never historically happened. As was said with regard to the same policy in 2018 - “I don’t find it surprising that Lloyd’s is in this space,” said Johnson, adding that to his mind the challenge for everybody is figuring out how to structure these policies so that they are actually protective. “You can create an insurance policy that protects no one – you know there are so many caveats to the policy that it’s not super protective.”
The most profitable policy for a private insurance company is one with the most expensive premiums that they never have to pay a claim on. They have no inherent incentive to take care of people who lost funds. It's "cheaper" to take the reputational hit and fight the claim in court. The more money at stake, the more the insurance provider is incentivized to avoid payout. They're not going to insure the assets unless they have reasonable certainty to make a profit by doing so, and they're not going to pay out a massive sum unless it's legally forced. Private insurance is always structured to be maximally profitable to the insurance provider.
The circumvention of multi-sig was a key factor in the massive Bitfinex hack of over $60m of bitcoin, which today still sits being slowly used and is worth over $3b. While Bitfinex used a qualified custodian Bitgo, which was and still is active and one of the industry leaders of custodians, and they set up 2 of 3 multi-sig wallets, the entire system was routed through Bitfinex, such that Bitfinex customers could initiate the withdrawals in a "hot" fashion. This feature was also a hit with the hacker. The multi-sig was fully circumvented.
Bitpay in 2015 was another example of a breach that stole 5,000 bitcoins. This happened not through the exploit of any system in Bitpay, but because the CEO of a company they worked with got their computer hacked and the hackers were able to request multiple bitcoin purchases, which Bitpay honoured because they came from the customer's computer legitimately. Impersonation is a very common tactic used by fraudsters, and methods get more extreme all the time.
A notable case in Canada was the Canadian Bitcoins exploit. Funds were stored on a server in a Rogers Data Center, and the attendee was successfully convinced to reboot the server "in safe mode" with a simple phone call, thus bypassing the extensive security and enabling the theft.
The very nature of custodians circumvents multi-sig. This is because custodians are not just having to secure the assets against some sort of physical breach but against any form of social engineering, modification of orders, fraudulent withdrawal attempts, etc... If the security practices of signatories in a multi-sig arrangement are such that the breach risk of one signatory is 1 in 100, the requirement of 3 independent signatures makes the risk of theft 1 in 1,000,000. Since hackers tend to exploit the weakest link, a comparable custodian has to make the entry and exit points of their platform 10,000 times more secure than one of those signatories to provide equivalent protection. And if the signatories beef up their security by only 10x, the risk is now 1 in 1,000,000,000. The custodian has to be 1,000,000 times more secure. The larger and more complex a system is, the more potential vulnerabilities exist in it, and the fewer people can understand how the system works when performing upgrades. Even if a system is completely secure today, one has to also consider how that system might evolve over time or work with different members.
By contrast, offline multi-signature solutions have an extremely solid record, and in the entire history of cryptocurrency exchange incidents which I've studied (listed here), there has only been one incident (796 exchange in 2015) involving an offline multi-signature wallet. It happened because the customer's bitcoin address was modified by hackers, and the amount that was stolen ($230k) was immediately covered by the exchange operators. Basically, the platform operators were tricked into sending a legitimate withdrawal request to the wrong address because hackers exploited their platform to change that address. Such an issue would not be prevented in any way by the use of a custodian, as that custodian has no oversight whatsoever to the exchange platform. It's practical for all exchange operators to test large withdrawal transactions as a general policy, regardless of what model is used, and general best practice is to diagnose and fix such an exploit as soon as it occurs.
False promises on the backing of funds played a huge role in the downfall of Quadriga, and it's been exposed over and over again (MyCoin, PlusToken, Bitsane, Bitmarket, EZBTC, IDAX). Even today, customers have extremely limited certainty on whether their funds in exchanges are actually being backed or how they're being backed. While this issue is not unique to cryptocurrency exchanges, the complexity of the technology and the lack of any regulation or standards makes problems more widespread, and there is no "central bank" to come to the rescue as in the 2008 financial crisis or during the great depression when "9,000 banks failed".
In addition to fraudulent operations, the industry is full of cases where operators have suffered breaches and not reported them. Most recently, Einstein was the largest case in Canada, where ongoing breaches and fraud were perpetrated against the platform for multiple years and nobody found out until the platform collapsed completely. While fraud and breaches suck to deal with, they suck even more when not dealt with. Lack of visibility played a role in the largest downfalls of Mt. Gox, Cryptsy, and Bitgrail. In some cases, platforms are alleged to have suffered a hack and keep operating without admitting it at all, such as CoinBene.
It surprises some to learn that a cryptographic solution has already existed since 2013, and gained widespread support in 2014 after Mt. Gox. Proof of Reserves is a full cryptographic proof that allows any customer using an exchange to have complete certainty that their crypto-assets are fully backed by the platform in real-time. This is accomplished by proving that assets exist on the blockchain, are spendable, and fully cover customer deposits. It does not prove safety of assets or backing of fiat assets.
If we didn't care about privacy at all, a platform could publish their wallet addresses, sign a partial transaction, and put the full list of customer information and balances out publicly. Customers can each check that they are on the list, that the balances are accurate, that the total adds up, and that it's backed and spendable on the blockchain. Platforms who exclude any customer take a risk because that customer can easily check and see they were excluded. So together with all customers checking, this forms a full proof of backing of all crypto assets.
However, obviously customers care about their private information being published. Therefore, a hash of the information can be provided instead. Hash is one-way encryption. The hash allows the customer to validate inclusion (by hashing their own known information), while anyone looking at the list of hashes cannot determine the private information of any other user. All other parts of the scheme remain fully intact. A model like this is in use on the exchange CoinFloor in the UK.
A Merkle tree can provide even greater privacy. Instead of a list of balances, the balances are arranged into a binary tree. A customer starts from their node, and works their way to the top of the tree. For example, they know they have 5 BTC, they plus 1 other customer hold 7 BTC, they plus 2-3 other customers hold 17 BTC, etc... until they reach the root where all the BTC are represented. Thus, there is no way to find the balances of other individual customers aside from one unidentified customer in this case.
Proposals such as this had the backing of leaders in the community including Nic Carter, Greg Maxwell, and Zak Wilcox. Substantial and significant effort started back in 2013, with massive popularity in 2014. But what became of that effort? Very little. Exchange operators continue to refuse to give visibility. Despite the fact this information can often be obtained through trivial blockchain analysis, no Canadian platform has ever provided any wallet addresses publicly. As described by the CEO of Newton "For us to implement some kind of realtime Proof of Reserves solution, which I'm not opposed to, it would have to ... Preserve our users' privacy, as well as our own. Some kind of zero-knowledge proof". Kraken describes here in more detail why they haven't implemented such a scheme. According to professor Eli Ben-Sasson, when he spoke with exchanges, none were interested in implementing Proof of Reserves.
And yet, Kraken's places their reasoning on a page called "Proof of Reserves". More recently, both BitBuy and ShakePay have released reports titled "Proof of Reserves and Security Audit". Both reports contain disclaimers against being audits. Both reports trust the customer list provided by the platform, leaving the open possibility that multiple large accounts could have been excluded from the process. Proof of Reserves is a blockchain validation where customers see the wallets on the blockchain. The report from Kraken is 5 years old, but they leave it described as though it was just done a few weeks ago. And look at what they expect customers to do for validation. When firms represent something being "Proof of Reserve" when it's not, this is like a farmer growing fruit with pesticides and selling it in a farmers market as organic produce - except that these are people's hard-earned life savings at risk here. Platforms are misrepresenting the level of visibility in place and deceiving the public by their misuse of this term. They haven't proven anything.
Fraud isn't a problem that is unique to cryptocurrency. Fraud happens all the time. Enron, WorldCom, Nortel, Bear Stearns, Wells Fargo, Moser Baer, Wirecard, Bre-X, and Nicola are just some of the cases where frauds became large enough to become a big deal (and there are so many countless others). These all happened on 100% reversible assets despite regulations being in place. In many of these cases, the problems happened due to the over-complexity of the financial instruments. For example, Enron had "complex financial statements [which] were confusing to shareholders and analysts", creating "off-balance-sheet vehicles, complex financing structures, and deals so bewildering that few people could understand them". In cryptocurrency, we are often combining complex financial products with complex technologies and verification processes. We are naïve if we think problems like this won't happen. It is awkward and uncomfortable for many people to admit that they don't know how something works. If we want "money of the people" to work, the solutions have to be simple enough that "the people" can understand them, not so confusing that financial professionals and technology experts struggle to use or understand them.
For those who question the extent to which an organization can fool their way into a security consultancy role, HB Gary should be a great example to look at. Prior to trying to out anonymous, HB Gary was being actively hired by multiple US government agencies and others in the private sector (with glowing testimonials). The published articles and hosted professional security conferences. One should also look at this list of data breaches from the past 2 years. Many of them are large corporations, government entities, and technology companies. These are the ones we know about. Undoubtedly, there are many more that we do not know about. If HB Gary hadn't been "outted" by anonymous, would we have known they were insecure? If the same breach had happened outside of the public spotlight, would it even have been reported? Or would HB Gary have just deleted the Twitter posts, brought their site back up, done a couple patches, and kept on operating as though nothing had happened?
In the case of Quadriga, the facts are clear. Despite past experience with platforms such as MapleChange in Canada and others around the world, no guidance or even the most basic of a framework was put in place by regulators. By not clarifying any sort of legal framework, regulators enabled a situation where a platform could be run by former criminal Mike Dhanini/Omar Patryn, and where funds could be held fully unchecked by one person. At the same time, the lack of regulation deterred legitimate entities from running competing platforms and Quadriga was granted a money services business license for multiple years of operation, which gave the firm the appearance of legitimacy. Regulators did little to protect Canadians despite Quadriga failing to file taxes from 2016 onward. The entire administrative team had resigned and this was public knowledge. Many people had suspicions of what was going on, including Ryan Mueller, who forwarded complaints to the authorities. These were ignored, giving Gerald Cotten the opportunity to escape without justice.
There are multiple issues with the SOC II model including the prohibitive cost (you have to find a third party accounting firm and the prices are not even listed publicly on any sites), the requirement of operating for a year (impossible for new platforms), and lack of any public visibility (SOC II are private reports that aren't shared outside the people in suits).
Securities frameworks are expensive. Sarbanes-Oxley is estimated to cost $5.1 million USD/yr for the average Fortune 500 company in the United States. Since "Fortune 500" represents the top 500 companies, that means well over $2.55 billion USD (~$3.4 billion CAD) is going to people in suits. Isn't the problem of trust and verification the exact problem that the blockchain is supposed to solve?
To use Quadriga as justification for why custodians or SOC II or other advanced schemes are needed for platforms is rather silly, when any framework or visibility at all, or even the most basic of storage policies, would have prevented the whole thing. It's just an embarrassment.
We are now seeing regulators take strong action. CoinSquare in Canada with multi-million dollar fines. BitMex from the US, criminal charges and arrests. OkEx, with full disregard of withdrawals and no communication. Who's next?
We have a unique window today where we can solve these problems, and not permanently destroy innovation with unreasonable expectations, but we need to act quickly. This is a unique historic time that will never come again.
Hi, Im in the UK & looking for the best way to make an investment in XRP. I’ve brought bitcoin in the past for online purchases etc, but XRP is new to me. Navigating resources out there is a little confusing, as different sources appear to offer conflicting advice. What I gather is that it may be worth converting GBP to EUR with my revolut account first, as EUR seems to get a better rate on cryptocurrency platforms, I’m not sure how true that is though? I then send EUR to binance or coinbase to convert to BTC/ETH. Here’s where it gets confusing again: many people appear to recommend sending these cryptocurrencies to another platform (Kraken?) to then convert to XRP. From what I can tell binance / coinbase allow conversion to XRP. Why would I add the extra step of using another platform, does it avoid additional fees? I Then send to a cryptowallet. Do you guys have any recommendations for software (preferably android) crypto wallets that can store XRP? im a little lost with that too, as there appear to be so many options. Any advice here is much appreciated, Thanks
2020 was a very good year for Digibyte. Binance and BitcoinCom exchanges added DGB trading, Bittrex added direct DGB purchases with fiat money / bank cards. ChangeAngel added support of direct crypto /DGB purchases with credit card (supporting dozens of fiat currencies). But still a lot progress to be done, except the most popular exchanges Coinbase and Kraken, I wanted to refer a list of services and exchanges that can add DGB and have a benefit from it. Exmo / one of the largest exchanges on russian market, can provide DGB in Russia and have a great benefit of it. Russian market is very large and there is still no direct DGB purchases with rubles. You can check the bestchange website, where Exmo is listed as one of the largest liquidity providers. Mercatox / one of the oldest exchanges based in UK with very good liquidity, DGB can be listed by voting /community. Vote for Digibyte on Mercatox Bitpay / one of the largest services that provide payments with crypto. Kuna / Ukranian crypto exchange. Bisq / decentralized p2p fiat/crypto exchange. BitcoinCom / additional trading pair BCH/DGB. Nexo / loans with crypto /DGB collateral.
It is no doubt Grayscale’s booming popularity as a mainstream investment has caused a lot of community hullabaloo lately. As such, I felt it was worth making a FAQ regarding the topic. I’m looking to update this as needed and of course am open to suggestions / adding any questions. The goal is simply to have a thread we can link to anyone with questions on Grayscaleand its products. Instead of explaining the same thing 3 times a day, shoot those posters over to this thread.My hope is that these questions are answered in a fairly simple and easy to understand manner. I think as the sub grows it will be a nice reference point for newcomers. Disclaimer: I do NOT work for Grayscale and as such am basing all these answers on information that can be found on their website / reports. (Grayscale’s official FAQ can be found here). I also do NOT have a finance degree, I do NOT have a Series 6 / 7 / 140-whatever, and I do NOT work with investment products for my day job. I have an accounting background and work within the finance world so I have the general ‘business’ knowledge to put it all together, but this is all info determined in my best faith effort as a layman. The point being is this --- it is possible I may explain something wrong or missed the technical terms, and if that occurs I am more than happy to update anything that can be proven incorrect Everything below will be in reference to ETHE but will apply to GBTC as well.If those two segregate in any way, I will note that accordingly.
ETHE is essentially a stock that intends to loosely track the price of ETH. It does so by having each ETHE be backed by a specific amount of ETH that is held on chain. Initially, the newly minted ETHE can only be purchased by institutions and accredited investors directly from Grayscale. Once a year has passed (6 months for GBTC) it can then be listed on the OTCQX Best Market exchange for secondary trading. Once listed on OTCQX, anyone investor can purchase at this point. Additional information on ETHE can be found here.
So ETHE is an ETF?
No. For technical reasons beyond my personal understandings it is not labeled an ETF. I know it all flows back to the “Securities Act Rule 144”, but due to my limited knowledge on SEC regulations I don’t want to misspeak past that. If anyone is more knowledgeable on the subject I am happy to input their answer here.
How long has ETHE existed?
ETHE was formed 12/14/2017. GBTC was formed 9/25/2013.
How is ETHE created?
The trust will issue shares to “Authorized Participants” in groups of 100 shares (called baskets). Authorized Participants are the only persons that may place orders to create these baskets and they do it on behalf of the investor. Source: Creation and Redemption of Shares section on page 39 of the “Grayscale Ethereum Trust Annual Report (2019)” – Located Here Note – The way their reports word this makes it sound like there is an army of authorizers doing the dirty work, but in reality there is only one Authorized Participant. At this moment the “Genesis” company is the sole Authorized Participant. Genesis is owned by the “Digital Currency Group, Inc.” which is the parent company of Grayscale as well. (And to really go down the rabbit hole it looks like DCG is the parent company of CoinDesk and is “backing 150+ companies across 30 countries, including Coinbase, Ripple, and Chainalysis.”) Source: Digital Currency Group, Inc. informational section on page 77 of the “Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) Form 10-K (2019)” – Located Here Source: Barry E. Silbert informational section on page 75 of the “Grayscale Bitcoin Trust (BTC) Form 10-K (2019)” – Located Here
How does Grayscale acquire the ETH to collateralize the ETHE product?
An Investor may acquire ETHE by paying in cash or exchanging ETH already owned.
Cash: The investor pays the subscription amount in cash and the Authorized Participant will use that cash to purchase ETH.
ETH: The investor transfers the ETH to the Authorized Participant, which will contribute the ETH in-kind to the Trust.
Source: Creation and Redemption of Shares section on page 40 of the “Grayscale Ethereum Trust Annual Report (2019)” – Located Here
Where does Grayscale store their ETH? Does it have a specific wallet address we can follow?
ETH is stored with Coinbase Custody Trust Company, LLC. I am unaware of any specific address or set of addresses that can be used to verify the ETH is actually there. As an aside - I would actually love to see if anyone knows more about this as it’s something that’s sort of peaked my interest after being asked about it… I find it doubtful we can find that however. Source: Part C. Business Information, Item 8, subsection A. on page 16 of the “Grayscale Ethereum Trust Annual Report (2019)” – Located Here
Can ETHE be redeemed for ETH?
No, currently there is no way to give your shares of ETHE back to Grayscale to receive ETH back. The only method of getting back into ETH would be to sell your ETHE to someone else and then use those proceeds to buy ETH yourself. Source: Redemption Procedures on page 41 of the “Grayscale Ethereum Trust Annual Report (2019)” – Located Here
Why are they not redeeming shares?
I think the report summarizes it best:
Redemptions of Shares are currently not permitted and the Trust is unable to redeem Shares. Subject to receipt of regulatory approval from the SEC and approval by the Sponsor in its sole discretion, the Trust may in the future operate a redemption program. Because the Trust does not believe that the SEC would, at this time, entertain an application for the waiver of rules needed in order to operate an ongoing redemption program, the Trust currently has no intention of seeking regulatory approval from the SEC to operate an ongoing redemption program.
Source: Redemption Procedures on page 41 of the “Grayscale Ethereum Trust Annual Report (2019)” – Located Here
What is the fee structure?
ETHE has an annual fee of 2.5%. GBTC has an annual fee of 2.0%. Fees are paid by selling the underlying ETH / BTC collateralizing the asset. Source: ETHE’s informational page on Grayscale’s website - Located Here Source: Description of Trust on page 31 & 32 of the “Grayscale Ethereum Trust Annual Report (2019)” – Located Here
What is the ratio of ETH to ETHE?
At the time of posting (6/19/2020) each ETHE share is backed by .09391605 ETH. Each share of GBTC is backed by .00096038 BTC. ETHE & GBTC’s specific information page on Grayscale’s website updates the ratio daily – Located Here For a full historical look at this ratio, it can be found on the Grayscale home page on the upper right side if you go to Tax Documents > 2019 Tax Documents > Grayscale Ethereum Trust 2019 Tax Letter.
Why is the ratio not 1:1? Why is it always decreasing?
While I cannot say for certain why the initial distribution was not a 1:1 backing, it is more than likely to keep the price down and allow more investors a chance to purchase ETHE / GBTC. As noted above, fees are paid by selling off the ETH collateralizing ETHE. So this number will always be trending downward as time goes on. Source: Description of Trust on page 32 of the “Grayscale Ethereum Trust Annual Report (2019)” – Located Here
I keep hearing about how this is locked supply… explain?
As noted above, there is currently no redemption program for converting your ETHE back into ETH. This means that once an ETHE is issued, it will remain in circulation until a redemption program is formed --- something that doesn’t seem to be too urgent for the SEC or Grayscale at the moment. Tiny amounts will naturally be removed due to fees, but the bulk of the asset is in there for good. Knowing that ETHE cannot be taken back and destroyed at this time, the ETH collateralizing it will not be removed from the wallet for the foreseeable future. While it is not fully locked in the sense of say a totally lost key, it is not coming out any time soon. Per their annual statement:
The Trust’s ETH will be transferred out of the ETH Account only in the following circumstances: (i) transferred to pay the Sponsor’s Fee or any Additional Trust Expenses, (ii) distributed in connection with the redemption of Baskets (subject to the Trust’s obtaining regulatory approval from the SEC to operate an ongoing redemption program and the consent of the Sponsor), (iii) sold on an as-needed basis to pay Additional Trust Expenses or (iv) sold on behalf of the Trust in the event the Trust terminates and liquidates its assets or as otherwise required by law or regulation.
Source: Description of Trust on page 31 of the “Grayscale Ethereum Trust Annual Report (2019)” – Located Here
Grayscale now owns a huge chunk of both ETH and BTC’s supply… should we be worried about manipulation, a sell off to crash the market crash, a staking cartel?
First, it’s important to remember Grayscale is a lot more akin to an exchange then say an investment firm. Grayscale is working on behalf of its investors to create this product for investor control. Grayscale doesn’t ‘control’ the ETH it holds any more then Coinbase ‘controls’ the ETH in its hot wallet. (Note: There are likely some varying levels of control, but specific to this topic Grayscale cannot simply sell [legally, at least] the ETH by their own decision in the same manner Coinbase wouldn't be able to either.) That said, there shouldn’t be any worry in the short to medium time-frame. As noted above, Grayscale can’t really remove ETH other than for fees or termination of the product. At 2.5% a year, fees are noise in terms of volume. Grayscale seems to be the fastest growing product in the crypto space at the moment and termination of the product seems unlikely. IF redemptions were to happen tomorrow, it’s extremely unlikely we would see a mass exodus out of the product to redeem for ETH. And even if there was incentive to get back to ETH, the premium makes it so that it would be much more cost effective to just sell your ETHE on the secondary market and buy ETH yourself. Remember, any redemption is up to the investors and NOT something Grayscale has direct control over.
Yes, but what about [insert criminal act here]…
Alright, yes. Technically nothing is stopping Grayscale from selling all the ETH / BTC and running off to the Bahamas (Hawaii?). BUT there is no real reason for them to do so. Barry is an extremely public figure and it won’t be easy for him to get away with that. Grayscale’s Bitcoin Trust creates SEC reports weekly / bi-weekly and I’m sure given the sentiment towards crypto is being watched carefully. Plus, Grayscale is making tons of consistent revenue and thus has little to no incentive to give that up for a quick buck.
That’s a lot of ‘happy little feels’ Bob, is there even an independent audit or is this Tether 2.0?
Actually yes, an independent auditor report can be found in their annual reports. It is clearly aimed more towards the financial side and I doubt the auditors are crypto savants, but it is at least one extra set of eyes. Auditors are Friedman LLP – Auditor since 2015. Source: Independent Auditor Report starting on page 116 (of the PDF itself) of the “Grayscale Ethereum Trust Annual Report (2019)” – Located Here As mentioned by user TheCrpytosAndBloods (In Comments Below), a fun fact:
The company’s auditors Friedman LLP were also coincidentally TetheBitfinex’s auditors until They controversially parted ways in 2018 when the Tether controversy was at its height. I am not suggesting for one moment that there is anything shady about DCG - I just find it interesting it’s the same auditor.
“Grayscale sounds kind of lame” / “Not your keys not your crypto!” / “Why is anyone buying this, it sounds like a scam?”
Welp, for starters this honestly is not really a product aimed at the people likely to be reading this post. To each their own, but do remember just because something provides no value to you doesn’t mean it can’t provide value to someone else. That said some of the advertised benefits are as follows:
Access to trading within a tax advantaged retirement account
Institutions can easily and safely get exposure to crypto in a more legal-friendly manner
Ease of use for those who are not very technologically savvy
Ease of access for someone who doesn’t want to set up a Coinbase account
Perceived trust in institutional platforms over something like Coinbase or Kraken
Degen traders who just want access to the volatility ETHE provides that have no interest in crypto beyond that
So for example, I can set up an IRA at a brokerage account that has $0 trading fees. Then I can trade GBTC and ETHE all day without having to worry about tracking my taxes. All with the relative safety something like E-Trade provides over Binance. As for how it benefits the everyday ETH holder? I think the supply lock is a positive. I also think this product exposes the Ethereum ecosystem to people who otherwise wouldn’t know about it.
Why is there a premium? Why is ETHE’s premium so insanely high compared to GBTC’s premium?
There are a handful of theories of why a premium exists at all, some even mentioned in the annual report. The short list is as follows:
ETHE is NOT redeeming shares and as such doesn’t have an effective arbitrage mechanism
ETHE has a 1 year wait to be sold on the secondary market, again negating the ability to effectively arbitrage the premium
People may simply be willing to pay a premium for the benefits stated above.
Why is ETHE’s so much higher the GBTC’s? Again, a few thoughts:
ETHE hasn’t been around as long, so there is less secondary market supply to go around
ETHE was listed at an insanely high premium to begin with
ETHE might simply be more popular at the moment
Could just be sheer stupidity (investors think ETHE is a 1:1 ratio not 1:11)
Are there any other differences between ETHE and GBTC?
I touched on a few of the smaller differences, but one of the more interesting changes is GBTC is now a “SEC reporting company” as of January 2020. Which again goes beyond my scope of knowledge so I won’t comment on it too much… but the net result is GBTC is now putting out weekly / bi-weekly 8-K’s and annual 10-K’s. This means you can track GBTC that much easier at the moment as well as there is an extra layer of validity to the product IMO.
I’m looking for some statistics on ETHE… such as who is buying, how much is bought, etc?
There is a great Q1 2020 report I recommend you give a read that has a lot of cool graphs and data on the product. It’s a little GBTC centric, but there is some ETHE data as well. It can be found here hidden within the 8-K filings.Q1 2020 is the 4/16/2020 8-K filing. For those more into a GAAP style report see the 2019 annual 10-K of the same location.
Is Grayscale only just for BTC and ETH?
No, there are other products as well. In terms of a secondary market product, ETCG is the Ethereum Classic version of ETHE. Fun Fact – ETCG was actually put out to the secondary market first. It also has a 3% fee tied to it where 1% of it goes to some type of ETC development fund. In terms of institutional and accredited investors, there are a few ‘fan favorites’ such as Bitcoin Cash, Litcoin, Stellar, XRP, and Zcash. Something called Horizion (Backed by ZEN I guess? Idk to be honest what that is…). And a diversified Mutual Fund type fund that has a little bit of all of those. None of these products are available on the secondary market.
Are there alternatives to Grayscale?
I know they exist, but I don’t follow them. I’ll leave this as a “to be edited” section and will add as others comment on what they know. Per user Over-analyser (in comments below):
As asked by pegcity - Okay so I was under the impression you can just give them your own ETH and get ETHE, but do you get 11 ETHE per ETH or do you get the market value of ETH in USD worth of ETHE?
I have always understood that the ETHE issued directly through Grayscale is issued without the premium. As in, if I were to trade 1 ETH for ETHE I would get 11, not say only 2 or 3 because the secondary market premium is so high. And if I were paying cash only I would be paying the price to buy 1 ETH to get my 11 ETHE. Per page 39 of their annual statement, it reads as follows:
The Trust will issue Shares to Authorized Participants from time to time, but only in one or more Baskets (with a Basket being a block of 100 Shares). The Trust will not issue fractions of a Basket. The creation (and, should the Trust commence a redemption program, redemption) of Baskets will be made only in exchange for the delivery to the Trust, or the distribution by the Trust, of the number of whole and fractional ETH represented by each Basket being created (or, should the Trust commence a redemption program, redeemed), which is determined by dividing (x) the number of ETH owned by the Trust at 4:00 p.m., New York time, on the trade date of a creation or redemption order, after deducting the number of ETH representing the U.S. dollar value of accrued but unpaid fees and expenses of the Trust (converted using the ETH Index Price at such time, and carried to the eighth decimal place), by (y) the number of Shares outstanding at such time (with the quotient so obtained calculated to one one-hundred-millionth of one ETH (i.e., carried to the eighth decimal place)), and multiplying such quotient by 100 (the “Basket ETH Amount”). All questions as to the calculation of the Basket ETH Amount will be conclusively determined by the Sponsor and will be final and binding on all persons interested in the Trust. The Basket ETH Amount multiplied by the number of Baskets being created or redeemed is the “Total Basket ETH Amount.” The number of ETH represented by a Share will gradually decrease over time as the Trust’s ETH are used to pay the Trust’s expenses. Each Share represented approximately 0.0950 ETH and 0.0974 ETH as of December 31, 2019 and 2018, respectively.
Voici LA chronique à découvrir, intitulée: La guerre contre Bitcoin. Idéal pour comprendre certains tenants et aboutissants
Voici LA chronique à découvrir, intitulée: La guerre contre Bitcoin. Idéal pour comprendre certains tenants et aboutissants… Bonne découverte! La guerre contre Bitcoin Bitcoin est peut-être le meilleur outil de liberté économique de cette génération, et peut-être depuis plusieurs générations. Malheureusement, Bitcoin a été furieusement étouffé par une guerre civile brutale depuis environ cinq ans maintenant; menée par des ingénieurs sociaux professionnels de certaines des entreprises les plus puissantes des médias sociaux. Leur talent dans l'art et la science de la manipulation a permis aux "Bitcoiners" de se battre largement entre eux plutôt que de chercher à créer des modèles commerciaux innovants basés sur les données qui pourraient révolutionner l'économie mondiale via Bitcoin. À la suite de la guerre civile de Bitcoin, trois versions concurrentes de Bitcoin ont vu le jour (BTC, BCH et BitcoinSV ), mais il en est de même pour environ 3000 autres projets et jetons de « crypto-monnaie » se faisant passer pour des entreprises légitimes, souvent jusqu'à un "exit scam" presque garanti, le fait de disparaitre du jour au lendemain avec tout l'argent des utilisateurs. Le principal bienfaiteur de la guerre civile Bitcoin a été Ethereum: une cryptomonnaie qui fonctionne comme une machine à états mondiale et permet un déploiement facile de tokens et de contrats intelligents. Mais le protocole Ethereum ne peut pas évoluer, et parmi les milliers de projets lancés, seule une poignée pourrait même être présentés comme pouvant devenir des entreprises légitimes. La plupart des autres sont des stratagèmes de Ponzi ou des émissions d'actions illégales enrichissant les développeurs et escroquant les investisseurs amateurs. C'est dans ce contexte que les défenseurs de BTC et de BCH, les porte-parole d'Ethereum et les altcoiners (nom donné pour englober toutes les autres cryptomonnaies) de tous bords s'alignent pour attaquer sans cesse le protocole Bitcoin préservé uniquement par le réseau BSV. Une industrie composée presque entièrement de criminels, de fraudes et d'arnaqueurs s'est unie contre BSV citant - et c'est là l'ironie! - une prétendue fraude et arnaque présumée qui serait l'existence même de BSV. Nous devons nous demander pourquoi ? Quel est le différenciateur clé de BSV? Pourquoi tous les arnaqueurs se sont-ils unis contre lui? Je suis fermement convaincu que pour la plupart, la motivation est la peur de la capacité de BSV à absorber l'économie mondiale et tous les autres projets «crypto» qui vont avec. Pour les autres, ou ceux qui ne comprennent pas le pouvoir du Bitcoin, ils sont entraînés dans une guerre civile et culturelle qui les dépasse. Il est essentiel de comprendre les pouvoirs en jeu et leurs implications pour Bitcoin et l'économie mondiale. Une histoire brève de Bitcoin Bitcoin a été lancé avec un "livre blanc" sur la liste de diffusion de cryptographie en 2008. Le pseudonyme « Satoshi Nakamoto » a déclaré une solution au problème de la double dépense. Or il s'agit là du problème de tous les systèmes de paiement électronique précédents, et c'était le seul facteur limitant l'adoption d'une monnaie digitale fonctionnelle. Mais qu'est-ce que le problème de la double dépense ? Pour faire simple, il était impossible de prouver exactement qui possédait quelles unités d'argent sur des registres distribués, de sorte que les utilisateurs ne pouvaient pas avoir confiance dans le système, et ces projets mourraient assez vite. Bitcoin a résolu ce problème avec un concept appelé la « preuve de travail ». Il pose la question: qui a utilisé le plus de puissance de calcul pour résoudre des énigmes arbitraires ? ceci afin de rendre compte de l'état du registre d'une manière qui coûte de l'argent, de sorte qu'il y ait une incitation économique à tenir un compte honnête des avoirs de chacun des participants. Ce processus est souvent appelé « exploitation minière » car les nœuds honnêtes qui maintiennent l'état du registre sont récompensés pour leur travail avec des nouveaux Bitcoins toutes les dix minutes - un peu à la même manière d'un mineur d'or qui est récompensé par de l'or en échange de son travail. Étant donné que Bitcoin n'avait aucune valeur lors de son lancement, il était extrêmement facile à miner et également gratuit d'envoyer des tonnes de transactions. En théorie, il s'agissait d'un vecteur d'attaque par déni de service (DoS). Une attaque DoS ou DDoS se produit lorsque les nœuds d'un réseau sont inondés de plus de données qu'ils ne peuvent en gérer et qu'ils se mettent donc à planter. Sur le jeune réseau Bitcoin, un crash comme celui-ci aurait été considéré comme un échec du réseau. Pour empêcher cela, un plafond de 1 Mo de données par chaque dix minutes de transactions a été codé en dur dans le logiciel - semant la première graine de la guerre civile Bitcoin. De 2009 à 2017, cette limite de 1 Mo sur le total des transactions était l'aspect technique le plus controversé du bitcoin et le déclencheur de la plus grande guerre civile virtuelle de l'univers de la cryptomonnaie. Pourquoi est-ce aussi important? Une seule transaction basique Bitcoin est relativement petite du point de vue des données, donc 1 Mo toutes les dix minutes donne environ trois à sept transactions par seconde avant que le réseau ne devienne trop encombré. Satoshi Nakamoto le créateur, a plaidé pour un nombre de transactions du niveau de Visa et bien plus, ainsi que son successeur direct en tant que développeur principal du projet, Gavin Andresen. Certains des premiers Bitcoiners influents comme Mike Hearn et Jeff Garzik ont également plaidé pour plus de données par bloc pour permettre à Bitcoin de se développer et de rester le meilleur système de paiement électronique. Ils étaient pour des «gros blocs» contrairement au camp des «petits blocs» qui préconisaient une permanence de la limitation de 1 Mo des blocs. Le camp des "petits blocs" estiment que Bitcoin n'est pas un réseau de paiement, mais plutôt qu'il s'apparente davantage à une banque décentralisée conçue pour stocker des Bitcoins qui ne bougent jamais: une sorte de coffre-fort d'or numérique. Ils voulaient que la limite de taille des blocs de 1 Mo reste permanente sous les auspices de chaque personne exécutant un «nœud complet» sans avoir à payer trop d'espace sur le disque dur. Cela signifierait qu'en période de congestion, les frais de transaction deviendraient absurdement élevés, mais cela n'aurait pas d'importance car le bitcoin ne devrait pas être utilisé pour des envois sauf en grosses quantités de toute façon, selon eux. En décembre 2017 les frais de BTC ont ainsi atteint les $50 par transaction. L'autre problème est que s'il est bon marché de rejoindre la gouvernance de Bitcoin, alors le réseau est facile à attaquer par Sybil, et je dirais que BTC est régi par des sybilles à ce jour. Le camp des "gros-blocs" estime que tout le monde sur terre devrait être en mesure d'échanger et de faire ses affaires sur Bitcoin pour des frais infimes, de l'ordre d'un centième ou millième de centime par transaction, afin d'apporter à la population mondiale la liberté monétaire, y compris aux pays les plus pauvres qui sont gardés en dehors du système actuel car considérés comme pas assez profitables pour des entreprises comme Visa. Les "petits-blocs" pensent que tout le monde devrait être en mesure de gérer soi-même le registre mondial chez soi, mais que seules certaines personnes très riches devraient pouvoir effectuer des transactions, ce qui est le cas quand les frais sont à $50 par transaction comme en 2017. Après des années de querelles, en 2017, Bitcoin s'est scindé en deux chaînes distinctes, et en 2018, il s'est à nouveau divisé. Alors quelle est la différence entre ces trois versions ? BTC est actuellement la version qui a le prix le plus élevé, avec la plus petite taille de bloc et la plus grande puissance de calcul. On peut dire que BTC à gagné la guerre médiatique. Malheureusement, il est régi par des développeurs et des sybilles qui contrôlent le consensus grâce à une utilisation intelligente de logiciels malveillants appelés «soft-fork» qui leur permet de saper les règles du Bitcoin. Ils utilisent ce pouvoir pour changer les règles des transactions en mentant aux nœuds et en leur disant de les valider quand même. Toute la culture BTC consiste à acheter du BTC afin de le conserver jusqu'à un moment dans le futur où il serait revendu à un prix exorbitant. Le but est de spéculer au maximum. Les paiements avec BTC, particulièrement les petits paiements, ou les transactions de toute nature non-monétaires, sont méprisés. BCH est un réseau basé sur Bitcoin qui pense que les blocs devraient être à peine légèrement plus grands, mais ils ont également des développeurs en charge des règles, tout comme BTC, et ils pensent que Bitcoin devrait être utilisé uniquement pour le commerce de détail, mais rien de plus. Le réseau change de règles tous les six mois. Les transactions non commerciales sont en général méprisées. Un nouveau scindement de BCH est prévu pour novembre 2020 suite à des conflits internes et l'incapacité à avoir un système de gouvernance dans un projet où les règles changent en permanence. BSV est la version restaurée du protocole Bitcoin original avec tous les paramètres ouverts afin que les nœuds honnêtes puissent s'engager dans un consensus conformément au livre blanc de Bitcoin - par la preuve de travail ! Le protocole est gravé dans la pierre afin que les développeurs de logiciels ne puissent pas bricoler les règles. Cela permet aux entreprises de planifier des décennies d'utilisation du réseau et d'investir en toute confiance. Il s'agit d'apporter une réelle innovation technologique au monde plutôt que de spéculer. En tant que seul réseau bitcoin totalement sans besoin d'autorisation, le commerce de toute nature est encouragé sur BSV. Tout, allant des réseaux sociaux aux expériences de science des données météorologiques ou aux tests de disponibilité du réseau, est encouragé. Paiements de détail, tokenisation, ou tout autre type de contrat intelligent est simple à déployer sans limitations. Bitcoin SV n'a aucune limite dans son protocole sauf l'esprit humain, l'innovation et l'esprit d'entreprise. Il vise également une adoption mondiale notamment par les pays pauvres afin d'apporter la liberté monétaire et l'inclusion à l'économie mondiale de ceux que les grandes entreprises actuelles comme Visa dédaignent comme pas assez profitables pour leur accorder leur services. Et c'est la racine de la haine envers BSV. Les "petits-blocs" ont investi toute leur réputation et leurs moyens de subsistance sur la notion que le bitcoin est incapable de s'adapter. Pendant des années, des experts présumés ont convaincu de nombreuses personnes que les limites de taille de bloc de 2 Mo, 8 Mo ou 22 Mo casseraient littéralement Bitcoin. Ils ont furieusement mis en jeux leur réputation sur ces fausses notions. Et ensuite, BSV a eu de nombreux blocs de plus de 100 Mo. En fait, il y en a même eu quelques-uns de plus de 300 Mo! prouvant que les petits-blocs se trompaient depuis le début sur les limites du réseau. Mais cette prise de conscience est une menace pour l'hégémonie de l'histoire médiatique qui a été crée sur Bitcoin. Depuis 2015, lorsque le Dr Craig Wright est apparu sur les lieux pour expliquer que le bitcoin avait en réalité ZERO limitations, il a créé un tollé massif parmi l'intelligentsia des petits-blocs. Les leaders d'opinion de l'époque étaient payés pour prendre la parole lors de conférences où ils expliquaient à tort que Bitcoin n'était rien d'autre qu'une réserve de valeur rare sans autre utilité, et surtout pas à usage des plus pauvres. Le Dr Wright parlait de l'échelle illimitée du réseau, de son exhaustivité de Turing, de l'objectif d'inclure enfin les plus pauvres dans l'économie mondiale, et d'autres notions inconcevables (à l'époque) sur Bitcoin. Sa passion et ses connaissances se sont heurtées à des calomnies et des railleries. Ils se sont concentrés sur l'attaque de son personnage au lieu de discuter de Bitcoin! C'est devenu l'une des principales méthodes d'attaque des petits-blocs. Lorsque de gros-blocs parlent des capacités de Bitcoin, ils sont ridiculisés en tant qu'escrocs et le sujet est toujours dirigé très loin de la discussion technique, car les petits-blocs savent bien qu'ils sortiraient perdants. Ils fouillent les dossiers personnels et cherchent des moyens de faire taire les gens du camp des grands-blocs de Bitcoin par des attaques personnelles - de la même manière que les guerriers de la justice sociale s'engagent dans la culture d'annulation contre leurs ennemis politiques. Qui est le Dr Craig Wright et que fait-il? Craig Wright est le scientifique en chef d'une société de recherche sur Bitcoin au Royaume-Uni appelée nChain : une société de 150 à 200 informaticiens. Craig dirige l'équipe qui étudie les possibilités de Bitcoin et de ses applications dans le monde. Il est l'un des experts en criminalité numérique les plus reconnus au monde avec les certifications SANS et GIAC ainsi que les titres GSE CISSP, CISA, CISM, CCE, GCFA, GLEG, GREM et GSPA. En outre, il est un polymathe multidisciplinaire de troisième cycle: un doctorat en informatique, économie et théologie et titulaire d'une maîtrise en statistique et en droit commercial international. En 2015, il a également été exposé par une publication conjointe de WIRED et Gizmodo en tant que Satoshi Nakamoto, le créateur de Bitcoin. Quelques jours après cette révélation, les gens qui le soutenaient ont vu leurs clés d'accès au code de Bitcoin révoquées, et de nombreux autres ont été instantanément bannis. Craig a été mis sous enquête par le bureau des impôts australien pour ce qu'il considérait être une erreur de comptabilisation probable de ses bitcoins. Les retombées ont été agressives et rapides, avec une gigantesque armée de petits-blocs, organisée sur Reddit et d'autres forums, et nouvellement financés par l'argent de la startup pro petits-blocs appelée «Blockstream». Leur message était clair: Bitcoin doit garder de petits blocs. Le Bitcoin ne peut pas évoluer et doit rester réservé aux riches, et toute personne proche de Craig Wright sera harcelée pour se conformer à une armée de comptes Twitter anonymes et sans visage. Voici un schéma qui retrace les financements de Blockstream et révèle comment le groupe Bilderberg, la banque centrale américaine (FED) et Mastercard on pris le contrôle du réseau BTC via Blockstream afin de le soumettre à leur propre profit: https://imgur.com/eFApDVE Au cours des années suivantes, Ira Kleiman, frère du défunt Dave Kleiman, a poursuivi Craig Wright en justice pour sa part du prétendu «Partenariat Satoshi Nakamoto», affirmant que son frère Dave était plus impliqué qu'il ne l'était réellement, et l'affaire est en cours actuellement, jusqu'à courant 2021. Ira Kleiman pense que Craig est Satoshi et il a investi une fortune incalculable dans cette attaque et a obtenu l'argent d'investisseurs extérieurs pour poursuivre sa poursuite. Il est clair que les bailleurs de fonds d'Ira pensent que Craig est également Satoshi. Les critiques qualifient souvent la révélation publique et le procès public de Wright de ternir énormément sa réputation, mais il convient de noter que les deux sont arrivés à Wright malgré sa volonté et qu'il ne souhaitait clairement pas être pris dans l'une ou l'autre situation. Au lieu de cela, Craig est un défenseur passionné de la vision d'un Bitcoin avec de gros blocs, appelant à la professionnalisation, à la légalisation et à l'utilisation mondiale de Bitcoin pour une utilisation à tous les niveaux du commerce. La réponse à la passion de Craig et à ses affirmations a été d'attaquer sa réputation et d'endosser Internet avec le surnom de «Faketoshi». Lorsque de simples brimades ont échoué contre le Dr Wright, des attaques ont été intensifiées pour remettre en question ses divers diplômes, des pétitions aux universités pour enquêter sur lui pour plagiat dans divers travaux, y compris des thèses de doctorat, etc. Wright a même revendiqué des menaces contre la vie des membres de sa famille et il y a plus qu'une preuve que, selon Ian Grigg, une des légendes de la cryptographie: «des gens sont morts pour Bitcoin, croyez moi, des gens sont morts». Les attaques en cours Cela ne peut être assez souligné: la communauté des petits-blocs est construite autour de tactiques d'ingénierie sociale professionnelles. Gregory Maxwell, co-fondateur de la société Blockstream, a été formé à la pratique de l'ingénierie sociale et l'a utilisé de manière si subversive comme un outil de propagande pendant son mandat en tant que modérateur rémunéré de Wikipedia, qu'il a finalement été démis de ses fonctions avec les journaux d'administration citant une litanie d'infractions, notamment: «Gmaxwell s'est engagé dans la création de faux comptes en masse…» - Alhutch 00:05, 23 janvier 2006 (UTC) «Menaces, insultes grossières, usurpations d'identité d'un administrateur», -Husnock 03:18, 25 janvier 2006 (UTC) «Son comportement est scandaleux. Franchement, il est hors de contrôle à ce stade. Son comportement d'intimidation doit cesser.» - FearÉIREANN 19:36, 22 janvier 2006 (UTC) «Sa liste de contributions est hors de propos. C'est du vandalisme. C'est un comportement auquel je m'attendrais d'un éditeur en furie, et franchement, c'est ce qu'est Gmaxwell.» - Splashtalk 20h00, 22 janvier 2006 (UTC) «Prétend être un administrateur, menaçant de bloquer les personnes qui ne sont pas d'accord avec lui, fait régulièrement des attaques personnelles» - SlimVirgin (talk) 12h22, 22 janvier 2006 (UTC) Il passe beaucoup de temps sur Reddit et d'autres forums à semer la peur sur les dangers des gros blocs, et il a été surpris en train de faire semblant d'être plusieurs comptes à la fois en train d'avoir de très longues discussions techniques sur Reddit destinées à submerger les nouveaux arrivants avec ce qui ressemble à un débat intellectuel contre une version de Bitcoin libéré de ses limites. Qui d'autre est attaqué? L'autre cible commune de la machine de guerre médiatique anti-BSV est Calvin Ayre: un milliardaire à la tête de l'empire du groupe Ayre. Calvin est un entrepreneur canadien et antiguais qui a lancé un incubateur Internet à Vancouver au tout début du boom Internet. Fils d'un éleveur, Ayre est surtout connu en dehors de l'économie Bitcoin pour la création et la professionnalisation de l'industrie du jeu sur Internet. Plus particulièrement, sous la marque Bodog, Ayre a aidé à moderniser les lois financières américaines obsolètes en poussant les limites dans les marchés gris qui existent où les dollars américains sont utilisés à travers les frontières pour s'engager dans un commerce juridiquement compliqué comme le jeu d'argent. Son travail dans ce domaine lui a valu une petite fortune et un passage sur la liste des «plus recherchés» du gouvernement des USA pour blanchiment d'argent. C'est un point sur lequel les petits-blocs aiment se concentrer, mais ils le sortent complètement de son contexte. Calvin a finalement plaidé coupable à une accusation mais a été le fer de lance de la modernisation des lois américaines qui existent aujourd'hui sur les marchés. Il est respecté pour son travail dans l'industrie du jeu, des médias et de la philanthropie. Calvin est le bienvenu aux États-Unis malgré la critique souvent citée selon laquelle il serait une sorte de hors-la-loi. Calvin Ayre Dans l'économie Bitcoin, Ayre est une figure de proue dans la gestion de nœuds Bitcoin honnêtes depuis plusieurs années sous les marques CoinGeek et TAAL, et il est un investisseur dans nChain ainsi que plusieurs startups de l'espace BSV. Bien qu'il soit probablement le plus gros investisseur à ce jour, il n'est pas le monopole que les petits-blocs laisseraient croire. Il est important de comprendre que des segments entiers de l'écosystème BSV existent complètement en dehors de son influence. Twetch, par exemple, est une entreprise indépendante appartenant à l'écosystème BSV, célèbre pour ses attaques contre les médias sociaux centralisés qui abusent de la censure. Ils sont même connus pour se moquer des entreprises qui acceptent l'argent d'Ayre, en plaisantant que Calvin possède tout sauf Twetch. Bien sûr, ce n'est pas vrai. Un autre excellent exemple est l'investisseur / entrepreneur indépendant Jack Liu : ancien dirigeant de Circle et OKEX. Liu possède la marque de hackathons CambrianSV ainsi que des propriétés précieuses dans l'espace BSV telles que RelayX, Streamanity, Output Capital, FloatSV et Dimely. Les autres acteurs clés sont MatterPool Mining et leur écosystème Mattercloud: une joint-venture entre des acteurs indépendants de l'écosystème BSV, avec des connexions directes aux protocoles BoostPOW et 21e8 et des relations avec des développeurs BSV indépendants. Bien sûr, il existe également des marques précieuses financées par Ayre. Il s'agit notamment de la propriété partielle via l'investissement dans HandCash, Centi, TonicPow et Planaria Corp de Unwriter. Une autre mesure importante à prendre en compte est la distribution de la puissance de hachage (autre nom pour la puissance de calcul du résau). Alors qu'au tout début de BSV, les entreprises appartenant à Ayre représentaient une quantité importante de hachage sur bitcoin, afin d'assurer sa survie, BSV est aujourd'hui en grande partie exploité par des mineurs concurrents de Ayre tels que Binance, F2Pool, OKEX et ViaBTC - dont aucun n'est «ami» de BSV ou d'Ayre, mais beaucoup se déclarent les ennemis. Ces mineurs soulignent bien la nature ouverte et sans permission de BSV qui permet à quiconque de participer, notamment à ses ennemis! Ayre est un acteur important, mais en aucun cas un contrôleur de la direction de la blockchain ou des entreprises indépendantes dans l'économie BSV. Mais pourquoi Craig poursuit-il des gens en justice ? Tout d'abord, et c'est crucial, le procès le plus important de Craig est l'affaire Kleiman. Les autres cas existent uniquement à cause de la diffamation publique du Dr Wright. Le hashtag #CraigWrightIsAFraud circule largement, poussé en grande partie par un mélange de personnages anonymes sur Twitter. Plus particulièrement Magnus Granath AKA «Hodlonaut» a été averti qu'une accusation publique de fraude courait à son encontre. La carrière du Dr Wright est en informatique et en criminalistique numérique, donc le déclarer publiquement une fraude sans preuve cause un préjudice financier au Dr Wright dans son domaine d'expertise commerciale. Puisque «Hodlnaut» a refusé de cesser, on lui a envoyer une requête pour être vu au tribunal afin de pouvoir apporter les preuves de ses accusations. Cela a causé le célèbre podcasteur de petits-blocs Peter McCormack à mendier d'être poursuivi aussi - en augmentant la rhétorique diffamatoire contre le Dr Wright. À la demande de McCormack, il a lui aussi été attaqué en justice pour être vu au tribunal. Le Dr Wright à depuis abandonné tous ses procès pour diffamation à l'exception de celui contre McCormack qu'il souhaite continuer pour faire exemple. Cela a aussi engendré la campagne #DelistBSV menée en grande partie par «CZ», le PDG charismatique de Binance-Exchange. Divers autres échanges comme Shapeshift et Kraken ont publié des sondages twitter demandant s'ils devaient emboîter le pas, et des petits-blocs bien organisés ont voté en masse pour retirer BSV de leurs échanges - citant la toxicité du Dr Wright pour avoir intenté des poursuites en diffamation contre Hodlonaut et McCormack. Finalement, BSV a été retiré de Binance, ShapeShift et Kraken. Il a également été noté publiquement par Coinbase et Gemini qu'ils ne soutiendraient pas cette version de bitcoin à la suite de ce drame public. Il faut noter qu'après 2 ans, Binance a retourné sa veste et est aujourd'hui devenu un des principaux mineurs de BSV. Au fur et à mesure que les choses progressaient, le fondateur de bitcoin .com, Roger Ver, a également réalisé une vidéo publique déclarant Wright comme arnaqueur. C'était après avoir travaillé sournoisement avec les développeurs Bitcoin ABC pour coder des points de contrôle dans le logiciel ABC de Bitcoin Cash, divisant de manière permanente le réseau Bitcoin pour la deuxième et dernière fois - un acte auquel le Dr Wright s'était opposé et pour lequel Roger est également poursuivi par d'autres parties privées en Floride. Roger Ver a été averti que s'il continuait, des poursuites juridiques similaires se présenteraient à sa porte pour avoir diffamé le Dr Wright, mais il à décidé de poursuivre les accusations publiques jusqu'à ce qu'il soit également entendu devant le tribunal pour fournir une preuve de la fraude de Wright, sous peine de sanctions pour diffamation publique. Aucune preuve n'a jamais été fournit, mais le Dr Wright a depuis abandonné ses poursuites contre Roger Ver pour se concentrer sur son procès avec Kleiman et celui avec McCormack ainsi que son travail sur Bitcoin. Et maintenant que se passe-t-il ? Nous avons établi l'histoire du Bitcoin, de sa guerre civile, des attaques publiques contre Wright, Ayre et BSV. Au moment d'écrire ces lignes, nous pouvons revenir sur les attaques contre Thomas Lee, Tim Draper et Jimmy Wales pour avoir eu une proximité avec BSV. Malgré la pression sociale, le rapport technique Fundstrat de Lee a rendu un examen élogieux du protocole fixe et de l'évolutivité infinie de BSV. Lee et son équipe étaient heureux de prendre la parole lors des événements précédents de CoinGeek, même après le tollé public. Pour la conférence CoinGeek 2020 à New York, McCormack, Hodlonaut, « Arthur Van Pelt » et d'autres acteurs tels que le Dan Held de Kraken et une cacophonie de trolls anonymes sur Twitter ont mis à profit leur expérience de la culture d'annulation à la bolchevique pour faire pression sur l'orateur Gary Vaynerchuk ainsi que d'autres orateurs prévus pour cette conférence, afin de les forcer à annuler leur participation. Cette attaque sociale contre BSV, Dr. Wright, Ayre et les autres entreprises qui utilisent le réseau BSV pourrait être un gigantesque cas de fraude à la consommation. Ils trompent activement les gens en leur faisant croire que le protocole fixe et l'évolutivité infinie de Bitcoin BSV sont en quelque sorte dangereux, alors qu'en fait, le protocole et le réseau sont imperméables à toutes les attaques, à l'exception de leur ingénierie sociale. Bitcoin SV s'est développé professionnellement avec un portefeuille de brevets de protection de niveau mondial. Il est utilisé par des entreprises indépendantes afin d'apporter des innovations technologiques et possède un groupe décentralisé de nœuds honnêtes qui se font concurrence. Le réseau est fixe, sécurisé et en croissance grâce aux investissements de petites entreprises et de gestionnaires de capitaux. Les transactions sont instantanées avec des frais de 0.0002€ par transaction en moyenne, explosant tous les records de compétitivité de l'écosystème et permettant aux plus pauvres de la planète d'enfin accéder à l'économie digitale mondiale. Les mensonges sont basés sur une campagne massive de dénigrement perpétrée par les communautés d'autres cryptomonnaies qui craignent l'adoption mondiale de BSV comme outil de commerce et ce que cela signifiera pour eux. L'histoire ne sera pas gentille avec ces manipulateurs et leurs réseaux qui sont financés par les fraudes probables des échanges de crypto-monnaies off-shore, le (très probablement) frauduleux Tether Stablecoin, et l'économie des arnaques de "pump-and-dump" qui sous-tend 95% du volume de négociation de l'ensemble de l'économie cryptomonnaie actuelle. C'est une guerre civile. Il y aura toujours des victimes, mais alors que BTC et BCH se concentrent sur les ragots et les affaires illicites, BSV veut que le monde entier soit plus libre, plus souverain et plus capable de coopérer sur le registre mondial de la vérité afin que les entrepreneurs du monde puissent s'engager à créer des entreprises ou de simples nano-services sont rendus possibles uniquement par Bitcoin. Bitcoin est un test d'intelligence. Au fil du temps, les personnes intelligentes pourront voir à travers le brouillard de distorsion de la réalité créé pour confondre les innocents et reconnaître cela pour ce que c'est, une attaque coordonnée pour tenter de supprimer une technologie qui à un potentiel unique dans l'histoire, et qui les rendrait obsolètes. Des exemples d'applications Bitcoin que vous pouvez utiliser dès aujourd'hui ? Les applications qui sont construites sur Bitcoin et interagissent entre elles par ce biais créent ce qu'on appelle le "Metanet". Si vous vous sentez prêt à faire le premier pas dans le futur vous êtes libres de tester les applications les plus populaires du Metanet sur https://metastore.app/apps?sort=money Le site le plus populaire du Metanet à ce jour est Twetch, une version de twitter incensurable sur la blockchain que vous trouverez ici : bit.ly/twetchapp _______________________ sources: inspiré de https://coingeek.com/the-war-on-bitcoin/ image : https://imgur.com/1Yb0Yle Voici un schéma qui retrace les financements de Blockstream et révèle comment le groupe Bilderberg, la banque centrale américaine (FED) et Mastercard on pris le contrôle du réseau BTC afin de le soumettre à leur propre profit: https://imgur.com/eFApDVE
Are these the right/best steps to getting ready to stake?
Hi, I own a small amount of Cardano on eToro, but would like to buy a larger amount to be able to stake. I know there is a lot of info within posts here, but it can be a little overwhelming for people new to this. So I have worked out what I think I need to do and have written a checklist below. I was hoping just to get someone to tell me if the steps are correct and my assumptions are right? Also any recommendations on different steps/changes/wallets is welcome. Thanks I am in the UK so currency I use is GBP
Deposit funds from Bank to Currency Exchange - Kraken. Fee is charged. It seems to me that Kraken's fees (overall, including fees further down list) are lower than Binance, but neither take money deposits without a charge unless you use Etana, but Etana taking a long time to verify my account and seem to have tech issues at the mo
Neither Kraken or Binance have GB /ADA pair so I need to purchase a crypto that does, such as Bitcoin. I believe this is a cheaper way than buying in USD for example. Fees/spread apply to this purchase
Buy ADA using Bitcoin. Fees/spread apply to this purchase
Transfer ADA to Daedalus wallet. Fees apply. I have installed Daedalus
Wait until (some date in near future) then Opt into a stake pool (I will read how to do that later)
If I want to sell Cardano in the future I will need to transfer back to an Exchange wallet and sell for GBP, again with all fees associated with that.
Does this look good? There are quite a few fees along the way, I hope they don't add up to too much. Thanks EDIT: Thanks for the help, I have manged to buy some Cardano!! I did a bank transfer to Kraken, which I was then a little worried about as it said it could take 3 days, but it arrived withing 30 minutes. I then purchased Bitcoin (which was hard work for a noob!) and then used that to buy Cardano. I can't transfer to Daedalus as there is a 72 hour lock on withdrawals!
How To End The Cryptocurrency Exchange "Wild West" Without Crippling Innovation
In case you haven't noticed the consultation paper, staff notice, and report on Quadriga, regulators are now clamping down on Canadian cryptocurrency exchanges. The OSC and other regulatory bodies are still interested in industry feedback. They have not put forward any official regulation yet. Below are some ideas/insights and a proposed framework.
Typical securities frameworks will cost Canadians millions of dollars (ie Sarbanes-Oxley estimated at $5m USD/yr per firm). Implementation costs of this proposal are significantly cheaper.
Canadians can maintain a diverse set of exchanges, multiple viable business models are still fully supported, and innovation is encouraged while keeping Canadians safe.
Many of you have limited time to read the full proposal, so here are the highlights:
Effective standards to prevent both internal and external theft. Exchange operators are trained and certified, and have a legal responsibility to users.
Regular Transparent Audits
Provides visibility to Canadians that their funds are fully backed on the exchange, while protecting privacy and sensitive platform information.
Establishment of basic insurance standards/strategy, to expand over time. Removing risk to exchange users of any hot wallet theft.
Background and Justifications
Cold Storage Custody/Management After reviewing close to 100 cases, all thefts tend to break down into more or less the same set of problems: • Funds stored online or in a smart contract, • Access controlled by one person or one system, • 51% attacks (rare), • Funds sent to the wrong address (also rare), or • Some combination of the above. For the first two cases, practical solutions exist and are widely implemented on exchanges already. Offline multi-signature solutions are already industry standard. No cases studied found an external theft or exit scam involving an offline multi-signature wallet implementation. Security can be further improved through minimum numbers of signatories, background checks, providing autonomy and legal protections to each signatory, establishing best practices, and a training/certification program. The last two transaction risks occur more rarely, and have never resulted in a loss affecting the actual users of the exchange. In all cases to date where operators made the mistake, they've been fully covered by the exchange platforms. • 51% attacks generally only occur on blockchains with less security. The most prominent cases have been Bitcoin Gold and Ethereum Classic. The simple solution is to enforce deposit limits and block delays such that a 51% attack is not cost-effective. • The risk of transactions to incorrect addresses can be eliminated by a simple test transaction policy on large transactions. By sending a small amount of funds prior to any large withdrawals/transfers as a standard practice, the accuracy of the wallet address can be validated. The proposal covers all loss cases and goes beyond, while avoiding significant additional costs, risks, and limitations which may be associated with other frameworks like SOC II. On The Subject of Third Party Custodians Many Canadian platforms are currently experimenting with third party custody. From the standpoint of the exchange operator, they can liberate themselves from some responsibility of custody, passing that off to someone else. For regulators, it puts crypto in similar categorization to oil, gold, and other commodities, with some common standards. Platform users would likely feel greater confidence if the custodian was a brand they recognized. If the custodian was knowledgeable and had a decent team that employed multi-sig, they could keep assets safe from internal theft. With the right protections in place, this could be a great solution for many exchanges, particularly those that lack the relevant experience or human resources for their own custody systems. However, this system is vulnerable to anyone able to impersonate the exchange operators. You may have a situation where different employees who don't know each other that well are interacting between different companies (both the custodian and all their customers which presumably isn't just one exchange). A case study of what can go wrong in this type of environment might be Bitpay, where the CEO was tricked out of 5000 bitcoins over 3 separate payments by a series of emails sent legitimately from a breached computer of another company CEO. It's also still vulnerable to the platform being compromised, as in the really large $70M Bitfinex hack, where the third party Bitgo held one key in a multi-sig wallet. The hacker simply authorized the withdrawal using the same credentials as Bitfinex (requesting Bitgo to sign multiple withdrawal transactions). This succeeded even with the use of multi-sig and two heavily security-focused companies, due to the lack of human oversight (basically, hot wallet). Of course, you can learn from these cases and improve the security, but so can hackers improve their deception and at the end of the day, both of these would have been stopped by the much simpler solution of a qualified team who knew each other and employed multi-sig with properly protected keys. It's pretty hard to beat a human being who knows the business and the typical customer behaviour (or even knows their customers personally) at spotting fraud, and the proposed multi-sig means any hacker has to get through the scrutiny of 3 (or more) separate people, all of whom would have proper training including historical case studies. There are strong arguments both for and against using use of third party custodians. The proposal sets mandatory minimum custody standards would apply regardless if the cold wallet signatories are exchange operators, independent custodians, or a mix of both. On The Subject Of Insurance ShakePay has taken the first steps into this new realm (congratulations). There is no question that crypto users could be better protected by the right insurance policies, and it certainly feels better to transact with insured platforms. The steps required to obtain insurance generally place attention in valuable security areas, and in this case included a review from CipherTrace. One of the key solutions in traditional finance comes from insurance from entities such as the CDIC. However, historically, there wasn't found any actual insurance payout to any cryptocurrency exchange, and there are notable cases where insurance has not paid. With Bitpay, for example, the insurance agent refused because the issue happened to the third party CEO's computer instead of anything to do with Bitpay itself. With the Youbit exchange in South Korea, their insurance claim was denied, and the exchange ultimately ended up instead going bankrupt with all user's funds lost. To quote Matt Johnson in the original Lloyd's article: “You can create an insurance policy that protects no one – you know there are so many caveats to the policy that it’s not super protective.” ShakePay's insurance was only reported to cover their cold storage, and “physical theft of the media where the private keys are held”. Physical theft has never, in the history of cryptocurrency exchange cases reviewed, been reported as the cause of loss. From the limited information of the article, ShakePay made it clear their funds are in the hands of a single US custodian, and at least part of their security strategy is to "decline to confirm the custodian’s name on the record". While this prevents scrutiny of the custodian, it's pretty silly to speculate that a reasonably competent hacking group couldn't determine who the custodian is. A far more common infiltration strategy historically would be social engineering, which has succeeded repeatedly. A hacker could trick their way into ShakePay's systems and request a fraudulent withdrawal, impersonate ShakePay and request the custodian to move funds, or socially engineer their way into the custodian to initiate the withdrawal of multiple accounts (a payout much larger than ShakePay) exploiting the standard procedures (for example, fraudulently initiating or override the wallet addresses of a real transfer). In each case, nothing was physically stolen and the loss is therefore not covered by insurance. In order for any insurance to be effective, clear policies have to be established about what needs to be covered. Anything short of that gives Canadians false confidence that they are protected when they aren't in any meaningful way. At this time, the third party insurance market does not appear to provide adequate options or coverage, and effort is necessary to standardize custody standards, which is a likely first step in ultimately setting up an insurance framework. A better solution compared to third party insurance providers might be for Canadian exchange operators to create their own collective insurance fund, or a specific federal organization similar to the CDIC. Such an organization would have a greater interest or obligation in paying out actual cases, and that would be it's purpose rather than maximizing it's own profit. This would be similar to the SAFU which Binance has launched, except it would cover multiple exchanges. There is little question whether the SAFU would pay out given a breach of Binance, and a similar argument could be made for a insurance fund managed by a collective of exchange operators or a government organization. While a third party insurance provider has the strong market incentive to provide the absolute minimum coverage and no market incentive to payout, an entity managed by exchange operators would have incentive to protect the reputation of exchange operators/the industry, and the government should have the interest of protecting Canadians. On The Subject of Fractional Reserve There is a long history of fractional reserve failures, from the first banks in ancient times, through the great depression (where hundreds of fractional reserve banks failed), right through to the 2008 banking collapse referenced in the first bitcoin block. The fractional reserve system allows banks to multiply the money supply far beyond the actual cash (or other assets) in existence, backed only by a system of debt obligations of others. Safely supporting a fractional reserve system is a topic of far greater complexity than can be addressed by a simple policy, and when it comes to cryptocurrency, there is presently no entity reasonably able to bail anyone out in the event of failure. Therefore, this framework is addressed around entities that aim to maintain 100% backing of funds. There may be some firms that desire but have failed to maintain 100% backing. In this case, there are multiple solutions, including outside investment, merging with other exchanges, or enforcing a gradual restoration plan. All of these solutions are typically far better than shutting down the exchange, and there are multiple cases where they've been used successfully in the past. Proof of Reserves/Transparency/Accountability Canadians need to have visibility into the backing on an ongoing basis. The best solution for crypto-assets is a Proof of Reserve. Such ideas go back all the way to 2013, before even Mt. Gox. However, no Canadian exchange has yet implemented such a system, and only a few international exchanges (CoinFloor in the UK being an example) have. Many firms like Kraken, BitBuy, and now ShakePay use the Proof of Reserve term to refer to lesser proofs which do not actually cryptographically prove the full backing of all user assets on the blockchain. In order for a Proof of Reserve to be effective, it must actually be a complete proof, and it needs to be understood by the public that is expected to use it. Many firms have expressed reservations about the level of transparency required in a complete Proof of Reserve (for example Kraken here). While a complete Proof of Reserves should be encouraged, and there are some solutions in the works (ie TxQuick), this is unlikely to be suitable universally for all exchange operators and users. Given the limitations, and that firms also manage fiat assets, a more traditional audit process makes more sense. Some Canadian exchanges (CoinSquare, CoinBerry) have already subjected themselves to annual audits. However, these results are not presently shared publicly, and there is no guarantee over the process including all user assets or the integrity and independence of the auditor. The auditor has been typically not known, and in some cases, the identity of the auditor is protected by a NDA. Only in one case (BitBuy) was an actual report generated and publicly shared. There has been no attempt made to validate that user accounts provided during these audits have been complete or accurate. A fraudulent fractional exchange, or one which had suffered a breach they were unwilling to publicly accept (see CoinBene), could easily maintain a second set of books for auditors or simply exclude key accounts to pass an individual audit. The proposed solution would see a reporting standard which includes at a minimum - percentage of backing for each asset relative to account balances and the nature of how those assets are stored, with ownership proven by the auditor. The auditor would also publicly provide a "hash list", which they independently generate from the accounts provided by the exchange. Every exchange user can then check their information against this public "hash list". A hash is a one-way form of encryption, which fully protects the private information, yet allows anyone who knows that information already to validate that it was included. Less experienced users can take advantage of public tools to calculate the hash from their information (provided by the exchange), and thus have certainty that the auditor received their full balance information. Easy instructions can be provided. Auditors should be impartial, their identities and process public, and they should be rotated so that the same auditor is never used twice in a row. Balancing the cost of auditing against the needs for regular updates, a 6 month cycle likely makes the most sense. Hot Wallet Management The best solution for hot wallets is not to use them. CoinBerry reportedly uses multi-sig on all withdrawals, and Bitmex is an international example known for their structure devoid of hot wallets. However, many platforms and customers desire fast withdrawal processes, and human validation has a cost of time and delay in this process. A model of self-insurance or separate funds for hot wallets may be used in these cases. Under this model, a platform still has 100% of their client balance in cold storage and holds additional funds in hot wallets for quick withdrawal. Thus, the risk of those hot wallets is 100% on exchange operators and not affecting the exchange users. Since most platforms typically only have 1%-5% in hot wallets at any given time, it shouldn't be unreasonable to build/maintain these additional reserves over time using exchange fees or additional investment. Larger withdrawals would still be handled at regular intervals from the cold storage. Hot wallet risks have historically posed a large risk and there is no established standard to guarantee secure hot wallets. When the government of South Korea dispatched security inspections to multiple exchanges, the results were still that 3 of them got hacked after the inspections. If standards develop such that an organization in the market is willing to insure the hot wallets, this could provide an acceptable alternative. Another option may be for multiple exchange operators to pool funds aside for a hot wallet insurance fund. Comprehensive coverage standards must be established and maintained for all hot wallet balances to make sure Canadians are adequately protected.
Current Draft Proposal
(1) Proper multi-signature cold wallet storage. (a) Each private key is the personal and legal responsibility of one person - the “signatory”. Signatories have special rights and responsibilities to protect user assets. Signatories are trained and certified through a course covering (1) past hacking and fraud cases, (2) proper and secure key generation, and (3) proper safekeeping of private keys. All private keys must be generated and stored 100% offline by the signatory. If even one private keys is ever breached or suspected to be breached, the wallet must be regenerated and all funds relocated to a new wallet. (b) All signatories must be separate background-checked individuals free of past criminal conviction. Canadians should have a right to know who holds their funds. All signing of transactions must take place with all signatories on Canadian soil or on the soil of a country with a solid legal system which agrees to uphold and support these rules (from an established white-list of countries which expands over time). (c) 3-5 independent signatures are required for any withdrawal. There must be 1-3 spare signatories, and a maximum of 7 total signatories. The following are all valid combinations: 3of4, 3of5, 3of6, 4of5, 4of6, 4of7, 5of6, or 5of7. (d) A security audit should be conducted to validate the cold wallet is set up correctly and provide any additional pertinent information. The primary purpose is to ensure that all signatories are acting independently and using best practices for private key storage. A report summarizing all steps taken and who did the audit will be made public. Canadians must be able to validate the right measures are in place to protect their funds. (e) There is a simple approval process if signatories wish to visit any country outside Canada, with a potential whitelist of exempt countries. At most 2 signatories can be outside of aligned jurisdiction at any given time. All exchanges would be required to keep a compliant cold wallet for Canadian funds and have a Canadian office if they wish to serve Canadian customers. (2) Regular and transparent solvency audits. (a) An audit must be conducted at founding, after 3 months of operation, and at least once every 6 months to compare customer balances against all stored cryptocurrency and fiat balances. The auditor must be known, independent, and never the same twice in a row. (b) An audit report will be published featuring the steps conducted in a readable format. This should be made available to all Canadians on the exchange website and on a government website. The report must include what percentage of each customer asset is backed on the exchange, and how those funds are stored. (c) The auditor will independently produce a hash of each customer's identifying information and balance as they perform the audit. This will be made publicly available on the exchange and government website, along with simplified instructions that each customer can use to verify that their balance was included in the audit process. (d) The audit needs to include a proof of ownership for any cryptocurrency wallets included. A satoshi test (spending a small amount) or partially signed transaction both qualify. (e) Any platform without 100% reserves should be assessed on a regular basis by a government or industry watchdog. This entity should work to prevent any further drop, support any private investor to come in, or facilitate a merger so that 100% backing can be obtained as soon as possible. (3) Protections for hot wallets and transactions. (a) A standardized list of approved coins and procedures will be established to constitute valid cold storage wallets. Where a multi-sig process is not natively available, efforts will be undertaken to establish a suitable and stable smart contract standard. This list will be expanded and improved over time. Coins and procedures not on the list are considered hot wallets. (b) Hot wallets can be backed by additional funds in cold storage or an acceptable third-party insurance provider with a comprehensive coverage policy. (c) Exchanges are required to cover the full balance of all user funds as denominated in the same currency, or double the balance as denominated in bitcoin or CAD using an established trading rate. If the balance is ever insufficient due to market movements, the firm must rectify this within 24 hours by moving assets to cold storage or increasing insurance coverage. (d) Any large transactions (above a set threshold) from cold storage to any new wallet addresses (not previously transacted with) must be tested with a smaller transaction first. Deposits of cryptocurrency must be limited to prevent economic 51% attacks. Any issues are to be covered by the exchange. (e) Exchange platforms must provide suitable authentication for users, including making available approved forms of two-factor authentication. SMS-based authentication is not to be supported. Withdrawals must be blocked for 48 hours in the event of any account password change. Disputes on the negligence of exchanges should be governed by case law.
Continued review of existing OSC feedback is still underway. More feedback and opinions on the framework and ideas as presented here are extremely valuable. The above is a draft and not finalized. The process of further developing and bringing a suitable framework to protect Canadians will require the support of exchange operators, legal experts, and many others in the community. The costs of not doing such are tremendous. A large and convoluted framework, one based on flawed ideas or implementation, or one which fails to properly safeguard Canadians is not just extremely expensive and risky for all Canadians, severely limiting to the credibility and reputation of the industry, but an existential risk to many exchanges. The responsibility falls to all of us to provide our insight and make our opinions heard on this critical matter. Please take the time to give your thoughts.
The power players of consumer finance in the 21st century will be crypto-native companies who build with blockchain technology at their core.
The crypto landscape is still nascent. We’re still very much in the fragmented, unbundled phase of the industry lifecycle. Beyond what Genesis Block is doing, there are signs of other companies slowly starting to bundle financial services into what could be an all-in-one bank replacement. So the key question that this series hopes to answer:
Which crypto-native company will successfully become the bank of the future?
We obviously think Genesis Block is well-positioned to win. But we certainly aren’t the only game in town. In this series, we’ll be doing an analysis of who is most capable of thwarting our efforts. We’ll look at categories like crypto exchanges, crypto wallets, centralized lending & borrowing services, and crypto debit card companies. Each category will have its own dedicated post. Today we’re analyzing big crypto exchanges. The two companies we’ll focus on today are Coinbase (biggest American exchange) and Binance (biggest global exchange). They are the top two exchanges in terms of Bitcoin trading volume. They are in pole position to winning this market — they have a huge existing userbase and strong financial resources. Will Coinbase or Binance become the bank of the future? Can their early success propel them to winning the broader consumer finance market? Is their growth too far ahead for anyone else to catch up? Let’s dive in. https://preview.redd.it/lau4hevpm7f51.png?width=800&format=png&auto=webp&s=2c5de1ba497199f36aa194e5809bd86e5ab533d8
The most formidable exchange on the global stage is Binance (Crunchbase). All signs suggest they have significantly more users and a stronger balance sheet than Coinbase. No other exchange is executing as aggressively and relentlessly as Binance is. The cadence at which they are shipping and launching new products is nothing short of impressive. As Tushar Jain from Multicoin argues, Binance is Blitzscaling. Here are some of the products that they’ve launched in the last 18 months. Only a few are announced but still pre-launch.
Binance is well-positioned to become the crypto-powered, all-in-one, bundled solution for financial services. They already have so many of the pieces. But the key question is:
Can they create a cohesive & united product experience?
Binance is strong, but they do have a few major weaknesses that could slow them down.
Traders & Speculators Binance is currently very geared for speculators, traders, and financial professionals. Their bread-and-butter is trading (spot, margin, options, futures). Their UI is littered with depth charts, order books, candlesticks, and other financial concepts that are beyond the reach of most normal consumers. Their product today is not at all tailored for the broader consumer market. Given Binance’s popularity and strength among the pro audience, it’s unlikely that they will dumb down or simplify their product any time soon. That would jeopardize their core business. Binance will likely need an entirely new product/brand to go beyond the pro user crowd. That will take time (or an acquisition). So the question remains, is Binance even interested in the broader consumer market? Or will they continue to focus on their core product, the one-stop-shop for pro crypto traders?
Controversies & Hot Water Binance has had a number of controversies. No one seems to know where they are based — so what regulatory agencies can hold them accountable? Last year, some sensitive, private user data got leaked. When they announced their debit card program, they had to remove mentions of Visa quickly after. And though the “police raid” story proved to be untrue, there are still a lot of questions about what happened with their Shanghai office shut down (where there is smoke, there is fire). If any company has had a “move fast and break things” attitude, it is Binance. That attitude has served them well so far but as they try to do business in more regulated countries like America, this will make their road much more difficult — especially in the consumer market where trust takes a long time to earn, but can be destroyed in an instant. This is perhaps why the Binance US product is an empty shell when compared to their main global product.
Disjointed Product Experience Because Binance has so many different teams launching so many different services, their core product is increasingly feeling disjointed and disconnected. Many of the new features are sloppily integrated with each other. There’s no cohesive product experience. This is one of the downsides of executing and shipping at their relentless pace. For example, users don’t have a single wallet that shows their balances. Depending on if the user wants to do spot trading, margin, futures, or savings… the user needs to constantly be transferring their assets from one wallet to another. It’s not a unified, frictionless, simple user experience. This is one major downside of the “move fast and break things” approach.
BNB token Binance raised $15M in a 2017 ICO by selling their $BNB token. The current market cap of $BNB is worth more than $2.6B. Financially this token has served them well. However, given how BNB works (for example, their token burn), there are a lot of open questions as to how BNB will be treated with US security laws. Their Binance US product so far is treading very lightly with its use of BNB. Their token could become a liability for Binance as it enters more regulated markets. Whether the crypto community likes it or not, until regulators get caught up and understand the power of decentralized technology, tokens will still be a regulatory burden — especially for anything that touches consumers.
Binance Chain & Smart Contract Platform Binance is launching its own smart contract platform soon. Based on compatibility choices, they have their sights aimed at the Ethereum developer community. It’s unclear how easy it’ll be to convince developers to move to Binance chain. Most of the current developer energy and momentum around smart contracts is with Ethereum. Because Binance now has their own horse in the race, it’s unlikely they will ever decide to leverage Ethereum’s DeFi protocols. This could likely be a major strategic mistake — and hubris that goes a step too far. Binance will be pushing and promoting protocols on their own platform. The major risk of being all-in on their own platform is that they miss having a seat on the Ethereum rocket ship — specifically the growth of DeFi use-cases and the enormous value that can be unlocked. Integrating with Ethereum’s protocols would be either admitting defeat of their own platform or competing directly against themselves.
The crypto-native company that I believe is more likely to become the bank of the future is Coinbase (crunchbase). Their dominance in America could serve as a springboard to winning the West (Binance has a stronger foothold in Asia). Coinbase has more than 30M users. Their exchange business is a money-printing machine. They have a solid reputation as it relates to compliance and working with regulators. Their CEO is a longtime member of the crypto community. They are rumored to be going public soon.
Let’s look at what makes them strong and a likely contender for winning the broader consumer finance market.
Different Audience, Different Experience Coinbase has been smart to create a unique product experience for each audience — the pro speculator crowd and the common retail user. Their simple consumer version is at Coinbase.com. That’s the default. Their product for the more sophisticated traders and speculators is at Coinbase Pro (formerly GDAX). Unlike Binance, Coinbase can slowly build out the bank of the future for the broad consumer market while still having a home for their hardcore crypto traders. They aren’t afraid to have different experiences for different audiences.
Brand & Design Coinbase has a strong product design team. Their brand is capable of going beyond the male-dominated crypto audience. Their product is clean and simple — much more consumer-friendly than Binance. It’s clear they spend a lot of time thinking about their user experience. Interacting directly with crypto can sometimes be rough and raw (especially for n00bs). When I was at Mainframe we hosted a panel about Crypto UX challenges at the DevCon4 Dapp Awards. Connie Yang (Head of Design at Coinbase) was on the panel. She was impressive. Some of their design philosophies will bode well as they push to reach the broader consumer finance market.
Early Signs of Bundling Though Coinbase has nowhere near as many products & services as Binance, they are slowly starting to add more financial services that may appeal to the broader market. They are now letting depositors earn interest on USDC (also DAI & Tezos). In the UK they are piloting a debit card. Users can now invest in crypto with dollar-cost-averaging. It’s not much, but it’s a start. You can start to see hints of a more bundled solution around financial services.
Let’s now look at some things that could hold them back.
Slow Cadence In the fast-paced world of crypto, and especially when compared to Binance, Coinbase does not ship very many new products very often. This is perhaps their greatest weakness. Smaller, more nimble startups may run circles around them. They were smart to launch Coinbase Ventures where tey invest in early-stage startups. They can now keep an ear to the ground on innovation. Perhaps their cadence is normal for a company of their size — but the Binance pace creates quite the contrast.
Institutional Focus As a company, we are a Coinbase client. We love their institutional offering. It’s clear they’ve been investing a lot in this area. A recent Coinbase blog post made it clear that this has been a focus: “Over the past 12 months, Coinbase has been laser-focused on building out the types of features and services that our institutional customers need.” Their Tagomi acquisition only re-enforced this focus. Perhaps this is why their consumer product has felt so neglected. They’ve been heavily investing in their institutional services since May 2018. For a company that’s getting very close to an IPO, it makes sense that they’d focus on areas that present strong revenue opportunities — as they do with institutional clients. Even for big companies like Coinbase, it’s hard to have a split focus. If they are “laser-focused” on the institutional audience, it’s unlikely they’ll be launching any major consumer products anytime soon.
Coinbase Wrap Up
At Genesis Block, we‘re proud to be working with Coinbase. They are a fantastic company. However, I don’t believe that they’ll succeed in building their own product for the broader consumer finance market. While they have incredible design, there are no signs that they are focused on or capable of internally building this type of product. Similar to Binance, I think it’s far more likely that Coinbase acquires a promising young startup with strong growth.
Other US-based exchanges worth mentioning are Kraken, Gemini, and Bittrex. So far we’ve seen very few signs that any of them will aggressively attack broader consumer finance. Most are going in the way of Binance — listing more assets and adding more pro tools like margin and futures trading. And many, like Coinbase, are trying to attract more institutional customers. For example, Gemini with their custody product.
Coinbase and Binance have huge war chests and massive reach. For that alone, they should always be considered threats to Genesis Block. However, their products are very, very different than the product we’re building. And their approach is very different as well. They are trying to educate and onboard people into crypto. At Genesis Block, we believe the masses shouldn’t need to know or care about it. We did an entire series about this, Spreading Crypto. Most everyone needs banking — whether it be to borrow, spend, invest, earn interest, etc. Not everyone needs a crypto exchange. For non-crypto consumers (the mass market), the differences between a bank and a crypto exchange are immense. Companies like Binance and Coinbase make a lot of money on their crypto exchange business. It would be really difficult, gutsy, and risky for any of them to completely change their narrative, messaging, and product to focus on the broader consumer market. I don’t believe they would ever risk biting the hand that feeds them. In summary, as it relates to a digital bank aimed at the mass market, I believe both Coinbase and Binance are much more likely to acquire a startup in this space than they are to build it themselves. And I think they would want to keep the brand/product distinct and separate from their core crypto exchange business. So back to the original question, is Coinbase and Binance a threat to Genesis Block? Not really. Not today. But they could be, and for that, we want to stay close to them. ------ Other Ways to Consume Today's Episode:
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